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The  Community's 
Institutional  Framework 
The  institutional framework  of the European Communities is  a  hybrid,  the  pro-
duct of both functional and political considerations. Since it was first  initiated in 1950, 
it has also  developed,  and the concepts underlying  it  have grown  more sophisticated. 
Central to  the system is  the continual dialogue  between  the  independent Commission 
and the intergovernmental Council of Ministers.  As things stand at  present,  the Com-
mission  plays a number of roles,  not all  easy  to  define;  and the  Council  is  probably 
over-burdened. While facile comparisons between the Community institutions and those 
of a federation  are clearly premature, some further strengthening and democratization 
of the  present institutional framework  are  evidently  necessary,  and  with  the  Commu-
nity's enlargement may be more necessary  still. 
Origins 
The existing Community institutions stem  from  two 
converging  lines  of development,  one  functional,  the 
other federal. 
First of all,  the  functional  aspects.  In the Schuman . 
Declaration leading up to the Coal and Steel Commu-
nity, it was  originally proposed that there should only 
be a High Authority and a Court of Justice. There was 
no proposal for a Council of Ministers nor for a Par-
liament. The reasons were partly historical: that is,  the 
Council of Ministers, in the eyes  of some people, had 
not worked  very  well  in the  Council of Europe.  But 
much  more  important  was  the  fact  that  in  people's 
minds  at that time  was  a  "military"  model  of admi-
nistration.  They  thought  of power  as  something  that 
was exercised over an emergency situation from above; 
and  it therefore  seemed  necessary  to  have  a  "High 
Authority",  so  called,  for  the  administration  of the 
coal and steel industries of the member states. Similarly 
it seemed necessary to have a Court of Appeal; but the 
idea  of a  constitution  with  executive,  legislative  and 
judicial branches had little force when the original pro-
posals were made. 
Fairly soon, however, two additional institutions were 
introduced into the negotiations; a Council of Ministers 
and a  Parliament. For purely functional  reasons there 
was  the  Authority  which  had to make decisions;  but 
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it could not take all  the decisions  by itself and it had 
to be in accord with the wishes  of the member states, 
hence  the  Council  of  Ministers.  The  Court,  again, 
existed  again  for  functional  reasons;  and  for  demo-
cratic reasons there had to be some sort of Parliament. 
The  second  line  of development  was  the  idea  that 
if in Europe the institutions that were created theore-
tically  approximated  to  those  of  the  federation  that 
Europeans  knew  best-the United  States-then there 
was an embryonic United States of Europe. In one of 
the publications of the High Authority of the Coal and 
Steel  Community,  one of the aims of the Community 
(it  was  stated)  was  "to set  up  the  institutions  which 
would  one  day form  the  basis  of a  United  States  of 
Europe". So  there was already a  rather large shadow 
or sun  in  the  sky,  whichever  way  one  looked  at it, 
which contributed to the constitution or the four insti-
tutions  which  made  the  Coal  and  Steel  Community, 
and  which  later  adapted  to  the  European  Economic 
Community;  that is  the so-called  executive-the High 
Authority,  the  Council  of  Ministers  representing  the 
member states, the Common Assembly,  and the Court 
of  Justice.  In  the  Common  Market,  these  become 
the  Commission,  which  has  the  same  sort of role  as 
the High Authority  and has now  subsumed  the  High 
Authority since the merger of the Executives;  this had 
nine  members originally  and is  now  to  have thirteen 
members,  all  independent  of the  member  states,  and 
the  appointed  Council  of Ministers,  European Parlia-
ment and Court. Political  policies 
This  is  one  of  the  essentially  political  elements  in 
the constitution of Europe.  "Political", of course, is  a 
word that has very different overtones in different lan-
guages:  in  the  original  four  Community  languages, 
French, German, Italian and Dutch, the same word is 
used  for  politics  and  policy  in each  case,  whereas  in 
English "politics"  is  not necessarily the same thing as 
"policy". The aims of the Community are political in 
that it seeks  to strengthen Western Europe by  uniting 
it.  It is  not  and  never  has  been  a  purely  economic 
arrangement; and if the Coal and Steel Community was 
really  concerned  with  rather  down-to-earth  matters, 
nevertheless coal and steel were very important in the 
economies as they were seen at that time. It was always 
regarded  as  the first  effort in what was  going to be  a 
combined operation including defence and a European 
Economic  Community.  Building  an  Economic  Com-
munity  involved  removing  the  economic  frontiers 
between the member states. The subject matter is eco-
nomic-because  economic  and  social  policy  is  being 
dealt with;  but the task is political because it concerns 
the  activities  of  governments,  not  directly  those  of 
businessmen and trade unionists. The Common Market 
is  not  essentially  concerned  with  production  or  con-
sumption,  but with  the achievement  of common  eco-
nomic  policies.  The first  part of that achievement  is 
the  surrender of certain  economic  policy  instruments, 
such  as  tariffs;  but this  will  only  achieve  the  desired 
results  if it is  accompanied by positive  integration. In 
that sense the Common Market is clearly political. 
False analogies 
At the same time, however, it would be a great mis-
take to believe that the institutions of the Community 
could be likened to those of a federation like the United 
States, partly because the terminology is  very mislead-
ing.  Looking  at the  way  the  Community  institutions 
operate, it might be  thought that the Commission and 
the  Council  of  Ministers  were  the  executives.  But  is 
this really the case?  The Council of Ministers is  much 
more like  a  legislative  body,  since  it is  the body  that 
produces  the  regulations,  directives,  decisions  and 
recommendations which are the four main instruments 
of Community legislation:  in this sense, the Council of 
Ministers  behaves  rather  like  a  Senate.  Similarly,  the 
Commission is not really an executive in the sense that 
a government is  an executive. It has a number of roles 
but they  are  not really  governmental  roles.  The  Par-
liament is  not a Parliament in the usual sense,  but an 
organism of what the French call "controle", which is 
not the same as "control". It is really an organism for 
supervising  the  so-called  executive  Commission.  The 
Court of Justice is the only one of the four main Com-
munity institutions that really bears any genuine resem-
blance to its counter part in a proper federation. 
The  Commission  is  not  an  executive:  it  is  not  a 
government. Is it then, as some people have suggested, 
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merely a  secretariat, a Civil Service body? It is a mis-
take to regard the Commissioners (the members of the 
Commission)  as  Ministers;  nor  is  it  right  to  regard 
them merely as very senior civil servants. In fact, they 
perform functions which in some degree combine these 
two  roles;  but  they  also  perform  other  functions  as 
well.  True,  some  of them  have  been  Civil  Servants, 
and quite a  number of them have been Ministers;  but 
once they are in the Commission they are in a peculiar 
half-world,  which  is  not strictly  comparable with  the 
familiar categories that they may have been in before. 
This is partly because  of the way  they are appointed. 
Theoretically, it might be said that if there is  to be 
a  supra-national  executive,  it ought to emanate from 
the people, and perhaps be directly or indirectly elected 
by a Parliament. But in fact the members of the Com-
mission  are  appointed  by  the  governments  acting  in 
concert,  and  to  this  extent  they  may  be  felt  to  be 
dependent on the governments. Theoretically, the mem-
bers of the Commission, and its President, are appoint-
ed  jointly  by  all  the  member  governments;  but it is 
very  difficult  for  a  member  government  to  object  to 
the  candidate  that  one  particular  government  wishes 
to put up.  At the same time,  once appointed they are 
not any longer  nominees  or representatives:  they  are 
not there to represent  France or Britain or any other 
country:  each  one is  supposed  to have  a  Community 
responsibility and operate collectively. They even  take 
an oath before the Court of Justice to this effect.  Most 
Commissioners,  with  very  few  exceptions,  have  exer-
cised their role in this supra-national fashion. However, 
if  any  of them  want  to  be  reappointed,  their  consti-
tuency  is  not  the  Community  as  a  whole,  but  the 
national  government concerned.  For that reason they 
may  tend  to  look  over their  shoulders  at the  end of 
their term of office,  towards the national governments 
that are likely  or not to  reappoint them.  This is true 
of the  nine  or fourteen  members of the  Commission; 
it does  not of course  apply to  the  Civil  Servants,  or 
"Eurocrats", who  have a  permanent status. 
Once a Comissioner is  in office,  he not only has for 
personal  and  perhaps  rather  ignoble  reasons  to  see 
what is  going on in his  national capital if he wants to 
be reappointed, but it is also his duty to know what is 
acceptable  in  the national capital. It would be  a  mis-
take for him to spend all his time in Brussels and never 
go  back  to Paris,  London or Bonn.  Clearly,  he  must 
to some extent be a liaison man with the Government 
of his own country. 
During his term of office he can only be dismissed on 
two grounds. One is if he goes mad or berserk, or com-
mits a crime or some grave professional fault-in which 
case  he  can be  removed  from  office  by the Court of 
Justice. The other way in which Commissioners can be 
removed collectively (not individually) is  by a  vote  of 
the European Parliament:  but although the Parliament 
has the power to throw out the Commission it has never 
yet  done so.  Why?  Partly because  it has the negative 
power to chop off the head but not the positive power 
to graft a  new  one on. The commission's roles 
The real functions  of the Commission  were  defined 
by Walter  Hallstein,  its  first  President,  as  three-fold: 
first  of all  a  motor;  secondly  an honest  broker;  and 
thirdly a  watch-dog of the treaty. In the first  sense,  it 
is the promoter of Community legislation; in that sense 
it  behaves  rather  like  a  Civil  Service,  which  pre-
pares  bills  for  the  Ministers.  Secondly,  it  sits  in  the 
Council of Ministers, and helps bring about agreement. 
Here  there  are  two  safeguards  for  any  government 
within the Community system. One is its practical right 
of veto on major issues.  But the Commission itself  is 
a  further  safeguard,  because  it  would  not  be  doing 
its job properly if it were to produce a proposal which 
in some way overrode what was seen as a vital national 
interest. The Commission therefore has to produce pro-
posals which are (a)  sensible  (b)  moderate (c)  accept-
able to the member states. Having produced a proposal 
it has still in its role as honest broker to get the pro-
posal accepted. 
Thirdly, the role of the Commissioners as  a  watch-
dog  is  fairly  simple.  As  watch-dog  of the  treaty  the 
Commission has the right and the duty to take to Court 
anyone who disobeys  the treaty or disobeys  the regu-
lations  that  follow  from  it.  It has  had  cases  against 
nearly all member states, if not all;  some it has won, 
some it has lost.  But it does have the duty to see that 
the treaty is  not ignored:  and if somebody flagrantly 
breaks the rules then the Commission has the duty to 
take them to Court. 
A fourth role of the Commission is  as an executant. 
As  the  Community  has  developed  the  legislative  role 
of the Community Institutions has not diminished, but 
it  has  been  seconded  by  a  kind  of  executant  regu-
latory  role.  In the  early  days,  much  of the  Commis-
sion's work was to  prepare "new Rome Treaties"-in 
effect  the  continuation  of the  negotiations  which  led 
to  the  Rome  Treaty.  This  involved  new  legislation, 
sometimes in very important fields;  new  policies;  new 
institutional systems  as in the case of the Agricultural 
Policy.  This in turn makes it possible for certain exe-
cutant  functions  to  be  handed  over  to  one  body  or 
another,  and in some cases  they  have  accrued to  the 
Commission. An example of this (which is  relevant to 
the  watch-dog  function  of  the  Commission)  is  the 
recent action taken against Continental Can, where the 
Commission cited  Article  86  of the Treaty-the anti-
monopoly  article;  the case  went to the Court of Jus-
tice.  The Commission  brought  the case  as  a  "watch-
dog"  because  it considered  that the  Continental  Can 
combine was getting too big for the Common Market, 
controlling as it did an estimated 70  % of the Benelux 
Canning Market. 
If  the Commission wins this case, one interesting con-
sequence will be that it will have acquired some powers 
similar  to  the  anti-trust  legislation  of  the  United 
States.  This  is  not  a  case  that  depends  on  actual 
provable  distortion  of  competition,  actual  provable 
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dividing of the market or price fixing:  it depends solely 
on the size  of the enterprise concerned. In that sense, 
even  in a  fairly  recent instance,  the Commission  may 
well  be extending its powers as an executant. 
Changes and  difficulties 
The  development  of the  Community  institutions  is 
not. entirely a  one-way  street:  it has not been entirely 
a  story  of  growth;  but  perhaps  the  most  important 
development so  far has  been  the  development  of the 
concepts involved. 
The  first  such  development  took  place  in  Luxem-
bourg, where the High Authority of the Coal and Steel 
Community did not in f.act use the powers that it theo-
retically possessed:  it always behaved very much more 
like the Commission of the EEC and engaged in "dia-
logue"  with  the  Council  of Ministers.  It did  not act 
as a  Government;  instead,  before it did  many  of the 
things  that it was  empowered  to  do  alone,  it usually 
consulted the Governments. This was not at all a dero-
gation  from  its  duties.  It was  a  simple  improvement 
on what the treaty had made possible. 
The  second  development  is  the  use  of Committees 
in  the  Common  Market.  Some  were  set  up  by  the 
treaty, for example the Economic and Social Committee, 
which  represents  workers,  producers,  consumers,  etc., 
and the Transport Committee. Since they began work, 
the  Communities  have  greatly  extended  this  practice 
of  using  committees.  At  their  Brussels  headquarters, 
there is in the entrance hall a list of all the Committees 
that are  meeting  on any  given  day:  there  are  nearly 
2,000  every  year.  Large  numbers  of national  experts 
are therefore travelling  to and fro;  and this  is  impor-
tant because in that way· the Communities' work feeds 
back-and bites  back-into the  work  of the  national 
administrations. 
One committee which deserves special mention is that 
of the Permanent Representatives of the member states. 
They prepare the meetings of the Council and can deal 
with  some  of  the  minor  questions  that the  Ministers 
might otherwise be wasting their time on. Even so, one 
of the  facts  of life  in  Brussels  is  that Ministers,  very 
often  Ministers  of Foreign  Affairs,  spend  much  time 
on very  down-to-earth  details  of which  they  are  not 
necessarily  expected  to  have  complete  understanding. 
A third important kind of committee is the Manage-
ment Committees  set up under the  Common Agricul-
tural system ("Common Agricultural Policy" is  a  mis-
nomer for what should be called a  "common agricul-
tural system".) The Management Committees represent 
a  new  institutional  development  that  the  agricultural 
system has introduced into the whole Common Market 
Institutional framework. The members of the manage-
ment committees  are  national  r~presentatives who  sit 
with  the  Commission  and  can  vet  Commission  pro-
posals. There is one for each main agricultural market. 
If the  Commission  puts  forward  a  proposal  and  the Management Committee  agrees,  it goes  into  force;  if 
the Management Committee does not agree, it still goes 
into  force,  but there  is  an  appeal to  the  Council  of 
Ministers.  The  committees  thus  reduce  the  delay  in 
taking decisions;  this is  very important in  the day-to-
day  management  of the  agricultural  market. 
The  Council  of Ministers  and  to  some  degree  the 
Permanent Representatives,  are the true  bottleneck in 
the Community system;  they tend to get bogged down 
in ridiculously  small  detail  and there  is  a  strong case 
fore  handing  over  more  of the  detail  to  some  other 
body.  It may be  that in  some  cases  the  Commission 
should deal with it; in some cases the Permanent Repre-
sentatives  should  be  compelled  to  cut  the  Gordian 
knot;  or  it may  be  th;t some  combination  like  the 
Management Committee system is better; but whatever 
the  solution  it is  clear  that the  Council  needs  to  be 
relieved  of some  of its tasks,  or at best to have them 
made  easier.  With  nine  Governments  represented  in 
the  Council,  as  there  will  be  from  January  1st  1973, 
this problem will  become graver still. 
The overburdening of the Council, the equivocal role 
of the Commission,  and  the  relative  weakness  of the 
European  Parliament,  are  all  matters  of  concern. 
Recently  the  Commission  commissioned  an  expert 
committee (the "Vedel Committee") to report on ways 
in which these defects might be remedied;  and it sub-
mitted  a  modified  version  of this  committee's  Report 
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to  the  Paris  "Summit"  meeting  of the  Community's 
Heads of State or Government in October  1972.  The 
Summit communique declared that the Heads of State 
or Government "recognized that the  structures  of the 
Community  had  proved  themselves,  though  they  felt 
that the decision-making procedures and the function-
ing  of the  Institutions  should  be  improved,  in  order 
to make them more effective".  The Commission  is  to 
submit a report on the institutional aspects of economic 
and monetary union by May 1st 1973;  and, finally,  the 
Council  and  the  Commission  are  "to put into  effect 
without  delay  the  practical  measures"  designed  to 
strengthen the powers of control of the European Par-
liament  to  improve  its  relations  with  both  the  Com-
mission and the Council. 
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The enlarged  community 
January  1st 1973,  the date  when the  United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark join 
the  European  Community  is  likely  to  be  remembered  as  a  historic  date.  The  size 
of the Community  and  it's influence  in  the  world  will  be  considerably  increased  by 
the  change  from  six  to  nine  members.  An assessment  of the  consequences  resulting 
from  this  enlargement  of the  Community  can  be  facilitated  by  using  statistics.  This 
approach, although imperfect and selective, gives an indication of the economic import-
ance  of the  enlarged  Community  in  relation  to  the  United  States  of America,  the 
Soviet Union, and Japan. 
Production and standard 
of living 
In 1970  the population of the "Six" was  189.9  mil-
lions  and the  population  of the  enlarged  Community 
253.4 millions, which is about 80  % of the total popu-
lation  of  western  Europe.  This  is  greater  than  the 
USSR (244 million), the USA (205  million), and Japan 
(104  million).  This  population  is  concentrated  within 
an  area  of  1.52  million  square  kilometres;  a  popu-
lation density of 166 persons per square kilometre. That 
of the United States of America  is  less  than one fifth 
of this, and the USSR one twelth.  However, Japan has 
a  population  density  about  five  times  that  of  the 
enlarged Community. 
Gross  national  product (at both current prices  and 
rate of exchange)  of the  "Six"  was  in  1970  $485  bil-
lion  and  that  of  the  enlarged  Community  exceeded 
$626  billion.  This compares  with the  United States  of 
America $993  billion, and Japan $196  billion. In 1958, 
the relevant GNP's were  the USA  $455  billion, Japan 
$32  billion,  and  the  enlarged  Community  $235  bil-
lion. During the period 1958 to 1970 GNP grew 218  % 
in  the  United  States,  267  % in  the  enlarged  Com-
munity,  and  a  remarkable  654  % in  Japan.  Between 
1960 and 1970 the mean annual rate of growth of GNP 
was  4.6  % in the "Nine" (for the Six  who  had inte-
grated  their  economies  in 1958  it was  5.3  %),  45  % 
in  the  United  States  and  a  phenomenal  11.1  % in 
Japan. 
Average  income  per  head  in  the  enlarged  Com-
munity was  (in  1970)  $2,118  compared with  $2,556  in 
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the  "Six";  Denmark  had  the  largest  GNP per  head, 
$3,170  followed  by  the  Federal  German  Republic 
($3,030),  Luxembourg  ($2,940),  France  ($2,907),  Bel-
gium  ($2,651),  the  Netherlands  ($2,404),  the  United 
Kingdom  ($2,179),  Italy  ($1,711)  and the  Republic  of 
Ireland ($1,324).  Comparable figures  for the USA and 
Japan were  $4,836  and $1,895  respectively. 
TABLE  1 
Mean  annual rates of growth at constant prices 
1960-1970 
GNP  GNP 
per head 
Germany  4.8  3.7 
France  5.8  4.7 
Italy  5.7  4.8 
Netherlands  5.1  3.8 
Belgium  4.9  4.3 
Luxembourg  3.4  2.6 
The Six  5.3  4.3 
United Kingdom  2.8  2.2 
Ireland  3.9  3.5 
Denmark  4.8  4.1 
The  Nine  4.6  3.7 
United States  4.0  2.7 
Japan  11.1  9.9 
Countries  such  as  the  United  Kingdom  and  the 
Republic of Ireland hope that membership of the Com-
munity will enable them to attain economic growth at 
something  approaching  higher  levels  of  the  present "Six". The new Members will be joining a Community 
where  it is  argued  that economic  integration  has  sti-
mulated  more  rapid  economic  growth.  For example, 
the  economic  progress  of Italy-which appears  to  be 
correlated  with  its  being  an original  member  of the 
Community-the  greater  homogeneity  of  the  social 
and  economic  structures  of  Member  countries  and 
increasing  prosperity for  all  members of the Commu-
nity.  The results  of membership  will  make themselves 
progressively  felt;  gradually  freeing  trade  and  care-
fully  evolving  common  policies  is  unlikely  to  lead  to 
lower  rates of growth  for the enlarged Community-
rather it will  be better able to deal with both internal 
and external crises. 
Economic development has to be seen not simply as 
changes  in  broad  aggregate  figures  but  also  changes 
in  and relative  importance  of each sector  of an eco-
nomy.  It will  therefore  be  interesting  to  observe  the 
structure of the enlarged Community sector by sector. 
Agriculture and  fisheries 
The  new  Members  will  constitute  a  market  for 
cereals rather than be additional producers;  the "Six" 
produced a total of 69  million tons of cereal per year 
between 1968 and 1970 and the "Nine" 90 million tons. 
However  with  the  accession  of the  United  Kingdom 
and Denmark, barley production will be nearly doubled 
to  about 29  million  tons,  only  slightly  less  than that 
of the USSR. 
Total  production  of meat in  the  "Six"  (1969)  was 
11.7  million  tons  and that of the  "Nine"  16  million; 
this compares with 23.2 million in the USA and 9.5 mil-
lion in the USSR. The "Nine" are major producers of 
pork,  6.2  million  tons compared to  5.9  million  in  the 
United States of America. Enlargement also means that 
Community  production  of  mutton  and  lamb  will 
increase from 163,000 tons to 426,000 tons; the United 
Kingdom alone producing 215,000 tons. 
Milk production in the enlarged Community will  be 
greater than even  the  USA or the USSR  97.2  million 
tons (in  1969)  as against 81.5  million and 52.7  million 
respectively;  the "Six"  produced 75.8  million  tons. 
Finally  fish;  the  total  catch  in  1970  was  for  the 
"Nine"  4.55  million  tons;  of  this  the  "Six"  caught 
2.15  million, Denmark and the United Kingdom being 
the  biggest  producers  among the  "Nine". 
Energy 
Production of coal in the "Nine" exceeded 306  mil-
lion  tons  (in  1970),  compared  to  161  million  in the 
"Six", 40  million  in Japan, 474  million  in  the USSR, 
and  542  million  in  the  USA.  Primary  electricity  pro-
duction in the "Nine" was nearly 55  million tons (coal 
equivalent) compared to 43 million in the "Six", 28 mil-
lion in Japan, 46 million in the USSR, and 98 million in 
the  USA.  The  increase  in  production -of coal  in  the 
enlarged  Community  is  above  all  due  to  the  United 
Kingdom  which  in  1970,  produced  144  million  tons, 
which was nearly equivalent to the total for the "Six". 
Total production of primary energy in the Community 
(1970  figures)  increased  from  331  million  tons  (coal 
equivalent)  to  500  million  tons  and gross  production 
of electrical energy from 580 Gigawatt hours to 851  Gi-
gawatt  hours.  This  compares  with  Japan  350  Gwh, 
USSR 742  Gwh and the USA 1,738  Gwh. In order to 
supply  future  energy  needs,  the  enlarged  Community 
will  have to be a  net importer of petrol;  in 1970  the 
"Six"  imported  404  million  tons  and  the  "Nine" 
519  million,  during  this  year  the  USA  and  Japan 
imported 71  and 170 million tons respectively. In spite 
of this, the "Nine" are approaching the USA in their 
production  of  petroleum  derivatives  (petrol,  fuel,  oil, 
liquified gases etc.) with production of 499 million tons 
in 1970,  the "Six" produced 392  million, compared to 
565  million in the USA and 160 million in Japan. 
Iron,  steel  and  aluminium 
Production of iron in the Community  will  increase 
from  21.6  to 25  million  tons (1970  figures),  this  com-
pares  with  105.6  million  in the  USA,  53.8  million  in 
the  USSR  and  0.9  million  in  Japan.  The  United 
Kingdom,  3.8  million  ~tons, comes  a  long  way  behind 
France,  17.9  million  tons.  The proportion  of iron in 
the  crude  ore is  on  average  just under  30  % in the 
enlarged  Community  which  compares  with  59  % in 
the USSR, 57  % in Japan, and 54  % in the USA. 
The  enlarged  Community  will  be  the  largest  pro-
ducer of crude pig iron, crude steel and finished rolled 
products  in  the  world.  In 1970  the United  Kingdom 
produced some  28  million  tons  of crude steel,  which 
makes it the second largest steel producer in the Com-
munity  after  Germany,  45  million  tons,  but  before 
France, 24 million tons. Had Norway joined the Com-
munity,  the  production  of  aluminium  would  have 
increased  from  912,000  tons  to  1,478,000  tons;  Nor-
way's  contribution  to  the  increase  would  have  been 
527,000  tons  out of a  total  increase  of 566,000  tons. 
The  "Nine"  produce  951,000  which  compares  with 
3,607,000 tons in the USA, 1,750,000 tons in the USSR 
and 733,000  tons in Japan. 
Paper,  chemicals 
and  construction 
As  with  aluminium,  Norway  would  have  been  the 
foremost  producer  of wood  pulp  in  the  Community 
of ten, 2.2  million tons out of a  total of 7.8  million in 
1970.  The  enlarged  Community  will  now  produce  a 
total of 5.6  million  tons compared to USSR  5.8  mil-
lion,  Japan  8.8  million,  and  the  USA  36.5  million. 
Total  production  of  paper,  card  and  board  in  the 
enlarged  Community,  20.5  million  tons  compared 
15 million tons in the "Six". (The United Kingdom pro-
duced just under 5 million tons which is  only exceeded 
by Germany, 5.5  million tons.) This compares with the 
USSR  6  million  tons,  Japan  13  million  tons,  and the 
USA 45  million  tons. Population (millions) 
Gross National Product 
(millions$) 
Origin of Gross Domestic 
Product 1969 (%) 
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~  Agriculture Sulphuric acid production, an important basic mate-
rial in the chemical industry was (in  1970)  4.4  million 
tons in  Germany,  3.4  million  in the  United  Kingdom 
and  between  3.3  million  and  3. 7  million  in  France, 
Italy and the  Benelux  countries combined.  Total pro-
duction  in  the  enlarged  Community  increased  from 
14.8  million to 18.7  million against 7 million in Japan, 
12 million in the USSR and 26.4 million in the USA. 
Total figures  ~or production of plastics are not avail-
able  but  (in  1970)  the  United  Kingdom  produced 
1.49 million tons, this was a little less than the 1.55 mil-
lion tons of France and the 1.69  million of .Jtaly;  Ger-
many  however  produced  4.32  million.  The  enlarged 
Community  produced  more  than  9.86  million  tons 
(1970)  which  is  more  than  the  USA,  8.66  million  in 
1969, the USSR, 1.67 million and Japan 5.11  million. 
The construction industry in the  Community is  not 
an industry as  say  are chemicals  and cars;  that is,  it 
does not mass-produce, nor is its structure rationalised. 
However, France and Denmark are two  of the major 
developers  of  "system"  building  techniques  in  the 
world.  The number of houses  and fiats  built  in  1970 
was  1.88 million in the "Nine" which is nearly as high 
as  that of the  USSR 2.20  million and exceeds  that of 
the USA 1.44 million and Japan 1.48 million. However 
for each 1,000 inhabitants, Japan built 14.4 houses and 
fiats compared to 9.4 in the USSR, and 7.49 in the USA. 
Denmark 10.28 a thousand leads in the enlarged Com-
munity,  while  the  United  Kingdom  and the  Republic 
of Ireland are below  the  average for  the "Six", 7.7  a 
thousand. 
Cars 
On  the  1st  January  1971,  there  were  218  private 
vehicles per 1,000 inhabitants in the. enlarged Commu-
nity, compared to 220 in the "Six", 432  in the United 
States,  85  in  Japan and  7  in  the  USSR.  Among  the 
"Nine" France leads  with 245  cars per thousand and 
Ireland is  a  long way  behind  with  122  per thousand. 
The  United  Kingdom  is  just  below  the  mean  of the 
"Six" at 213  per thousand, however the United King-
dom  is  a  major  producer  of  cars  and  commercial 
vehicles,  1.6 million passenger cars (1970)  compared to 
3.5  million  in the  Federal German  Republic,  2.5  mil-
lion in France and 1.7  million in Italy. In addition the 
UK produced 458,000 commercial vehicles (1970) which 
is the largest output of any single member of the enlar-
ged  Community.  Germany  is  next  with  314,000.  In 
1970 the enlarged Community was the largest producer 
of  cars  in  the  world,  9.67  million  vehicles  against 
6.55  million  in  the  USA,  3.18  million  in  Japan  and 
0.35  million  in the  USSR.  In addition  they  produced 
1.24  million  commercial  vehicles  compared  with 
2.11  million  in  Japan,  1.73  million  in  the  USA  and 
0.82 million in the USSR. 
Transport 
On  January  1st  1971  the  enlarged  Community  had 
112,000  kilometres  of utilised  railway  track compared 
to 88,500 in the "Six" 136,000 in the USSR and 336,400 
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in  the USA.  However  the  geographical  nature of the 
areas covered in each country varies widely.  Commer-
cial airlines in the "Nine" carried nearly 60,000 million 
passenger kilometres in 1970 compared to 36,000 in the 
"Six", 187,000 in the USA and (in  1966) 45,000  in the 
USSR.  The  United  Kingdom  leads  in  the  enlarged 
Community with  16,000  passenger kilometres followed 
by France, 12,000 and Germany 8,000. 
The  United  Kingdom  has  by  far  the  largest  Mer-
chant  Navy;  in  this  field  the  enlarged  Community  is 
much  bigger  than the total for the  other  three  major 
nations. 
TABLE 2 
Merchant Fleet on 1st July 1970 
(1 ,000 tons) 
Total 
Germany  7,881 
France  6,458 
Italy  7,448 
Netherlands  5,807 
Belgium/Luxembourg  1,062 
The Six  28,656 
United  Kingdom  25,825 
Ireland  175 
Denmark  3,315 
The Nine  57,970 
United States  18,463 
USSR  14,832 

















In the enlarged Community imports and exports will 
represent  about  18  %  of  GNP;  the  figures  for  the 
"Six"  is  18.3  %  of  GNP.  The  USA  imported  and 
exported  4  %  and  4.4  %  respectively  of GNP,  and 
Japan  9.6  and  9.8  %.  The  United  Kingdom  is  the 
second  largest  exporter  in  the  enlarged  Community, 
$19,351  million  (1970)  compared  to  Germany 
$34,189 million and France $17,739  million. In relative 
terms  there  are  marked  differences  between  the  Nine 
states,  Ireland  is  the  most  dependent  upon  imports, 
40.9  %  of GNP,  although  they  do  not export  more 
than 27.6  % of GNP; France and the United Kingdom 
exports  are  12  % and  16.2  % of their GNPs respec-
tively, while Belgium/Luxembourg and the Netherlands 
exports are 43.8  % and 37.  7%  of GNP. In 1970  the 
"Six" had a surplus on trading account of $77  million 
while the "Nine" had a  deficit  of $5,164  million.  The 
United  Kingdom  deficit  on  trade  was  the  largest 
$2,372 million.  However, among the "Nine" only Ger-
many  and  the  Belgium/Luxembourg  union  were  cre-
ditors  throughout the  decade.  The "Nine" constitutes 
the  largest single  trading  force  in  the  world.  In spite 
of their high level  of internal trade, trade with  other 
countries  is  very  significant.  In  the  world  total  of 
imports the countries  of the  enlarged Community im-
ported just under 40  % and provided just over 40  % 
of the  total exports.  This compares with 30.3  % and 31.8  % in the "Six", 13.7  % and 15.5  % in the USA, 
6.5  % and 6.9  % in Japan and 4  % and 4.6  % in the 
USS.R. 
In 1970,  just over  10  % of total imports  and 8  % 
of total  exports  of the  "Nine"  were  with  the  USA. 
and just over 32  % and 30  % respectively with the rest 
of the world (countries in the EFTA not included). For 
the "Six" the totals were 10,2  % and 29.3  % of imports 
and 7.5  %and 29.3  % of exports. The United Kingdom 
-but with the reservation of Irish exports to the USA 
-were the only country of the "Nine" whose level  of 
trade with the rest of the world exceeded the mean for 
the "Six",  11.7  % and  50.7  % of the  exports  of the 
USA and the rest of the world respectively. 
Standards of living 
in  the enlarged  Community 
A Reader's Digest survey 1 in 1970 attempted a com-
parison of living standards between western European 
countries. This was based upon criteria such as posses-
sion  of  baths,  washing  machines,  coloured  televi-
sions etc., but excluding food. Sweden and Switzerland 
lead the European standard of living  table;  the rating 
of members in the enlarged Community is  as follows: 
TABLE  3 











Country  Index 
The Netherlands  89.4 
Denmark  88.0 
Great Britain  84.9 
Germany  78.9 
France  76.7 
Belgium  63.5 
Italy  60.0 
Ireland  50.9 











France and  Belgium  are  not among  the  leaders  in 
this  standard of living table because  in the total con-
sumption of domestic goods, food is a much more im-
portant item  in  their  budgets  and  has  been  excluded 
from the survey. Comparison of standards of living in 
different countries are  notoriously difficult  to  produce 
but there are certain indicators which  offer  at least a 
guideline. Gross National Product of the poorer coun-
tries such as Italy, has tended to increase more rapidly 
than in the more affiuent Members of the Community, 
and through time it is  hoped that there will be a con-
vergence in  both living  standards and distributions  of 
incomes  within  and  between  Member  countries.  The 
statistical analysis shows that differences in income and 
inequalities  in  its  distribution  have  diminished,  espe-
cially in the  more developed  countries.  Less  favoured 
1  Reader's  Digest:  Survey  of Europe. 
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groups  still  exist.  In  Italy  and  Ireland,  where  more 
than half the population still lives  on the land,  16  % 
to 20  % of adults live  in families  who  (in  1968)  had 
incomes  less  tax  and  other  deductions,  of  less  than 
12 dollars a week.  Some 14  % of French adults,  16  % 
of Irish adults and 19  % of Italian adults live in homes 
in which  the net income  was  between  12  dollars  and 
23  dollars per week.  Most if not all consumer durables 
are too expensive for these people. 
In the greater part of the Community family incomes 
are between 24 dollars and 71  dollars per week. This is 
the  most  important  single  group  in  most  countries. 
67  % of the Dutch, 66  % of the British, 57  % of the 
German,  56  % of the  Belgians,  55  % of the  Irish, 
54  % of the French, and 52  % of the Italians. However 
in Denmark this group is no larger than 27  % of the 
families,  an estimated  59  % of Danish families  have 
incomes  greater  than  72  dollars  as  do  32  %  of the 
Dutch,  25  % of the  French,  22  % of the  Belgians, 
18  % of the  British,  13  % of the  Italians  and  only 
10  % of  the  Irish.  On  average  the  Danish  are  the 
richest members of the  enlarged Community  while  of 
the new  Members, Ireland with 33  % of their families 
receiving  an income  of less  than  23  dollars  are  the 
least affiuent. 
There are big differences in wages between countries. 
Gross  wages  are  highest  in Denmark,  Germany  and 
Britain,  however,  when  additional  payments  such  as 
Family  Allowances  are  taken  into  account,  the  real 
incomes  of  the  Italian,  Belgian  and  French  workers 
are increased  and are among the highest in the Com-
munity.  Comparisons  of this  type  must  of course  be 
related to the type of goods which constitute the weekly 
expenditure of families in the different countries. 
Indirect taxes are the largest proportion of total taxa-
tion in the Republic of Ireland, 72.5  %, and in France 
69.8  %.  In general direct taxation is  higher in the new 
member countries, 36.7  % in the United Kingdom and 
45.5  %  in  Denmark.  This  is  comparable  with  the 
44.4  % in the Netherlands but is much higher than the 
21.6  % in France, 26.9  % in Italy, 33  % in Germany, 
34.8  % in Luxembourg and 35  % in Belgium. 
The  differences  in  the  structure  and  standard  of 
living  among  the  Member  countries,  as  can  be  seen, 
are important, but it is hoped that within the enlarged 
Community  there  will  be,  through  time,  diminishing 
variations  in _living  standards.  This  will  be  attained 
not by  countries converging  as  a  "community  mean" 
but rather equalisation will be part of a process where 
all living standards within the Community rise  to new 
levels. 
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Monetary and  Economic  Union 
The drafters of the Rome Treaty,  which  founded  the  European  Economic  Com-
munity in 1958,  believed that free  trade between the six member states would lead pro-
gressively to an ever closer union, at first  in  terms of economics, and later in  terms of 
politics. But they did not attempt to lay  down how they  believed this would or should 
happen, nor even when; these were decisions which could only be taken when the time 
as ripe. It was not unti/1970 that the Six embarked on their first  deliberate attempt to 
turn their free  trade area into an  economic and monetary union. 
In its  most  extreme  form,  monetary  and  economic 
union means  a  single  economy  and a  single  currency, 
with centralised economic decision-making. The centra-
lised economic policy-making does not need to be abso-
lute and all-encompassing, but it does need to be domi-
nant:  the  states in America,  the provinces  in  Canada, 
and  even  to  a  lesser  extent  the  local  authorities  in 
Britain,  all  have  local  decision-making  powers  which 
have  an  economic  impact,  but in  all  three  countries 
the  central  government's  powers  of guiding  the  e~o­
nomy  are  pre-eminent.  The  political  difficulty  about 
creating such an economic and monetary union, is that 
the component territories  must agree  to  give  up their 
sovereign  rights  to  manage  their  own  economies;  in 
the US,  the states long conducted a  running  battle  to 
prevent the encroachment of the federal  authorities in 
Washington  on their "states'  rights",  and even  today 
the controversy is  not entirely  dead.  A  similar  battle 
between federalists  and nationalists is  bound to attend 
any attempt to create an economic and monetary union 
in Europe. The economic difficulty about creating such 
a  union  is  that  the  component  territories  may  have 
very  different  economies-large  and  small,  rich  and 
poor,  agricultural  and  industrialised,  hot  and  cold, 
advanced and backward-which may require, or seem 
to require, distinct economic policies and separate cur-
rencies. 
In the  face  of these  difficulties,  it may legitimately 
be asked why  the  European countries  should  want to 
move towards monetary and economic union; why not 
simply permit free trade and leave it at that? The eco-
nomic argument would be that free trade leads sooner 
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or later to a situation where the "separate" economies 
become  so  dependent  on each  other that none of the 
governments  can  really  operate  an  independent  eco-
nomic policy. This interdependence has already become 
fairly pronounced, especially in the case of the smaller 
countries:  just  under  half  of  the  national  output  of 
Holland  and  Belgium  goes  in  exports,  and  approxi-
mately half of these exports are sent to other members 
of the  European  Community;  a  comparable  share  of 
the consumption  of these  countries  comes  in imports 
from  Community  neighbours.  Their  economies  are 
therefore heavily  influenced  by those  of France, Ger-
many and Italy: if German prices go up, Dutch import 
(and therefore manufacturing) costs go  up,  leading to 
an increase  in Dutch prices;  if German consumption 
goes up, Dutch exports (and therefore Dutch incomes) 
also tend to go up. Even the big countries are affected: 
if the  Italian  economy  goes  into  a  recession,  Italian 
manufacturers  try to  maintain  their  income  by step-
ping up  exports to the most accessible  market,  which 
happens to be the rest of the Community; if the Ger-
man  economy  is  already  going  flat  out,  with  a  big 
consumer  spending  spree,  this  is  likely  to  mean  that 
the German trade balance will go into deficit. 
These  general  economic  arguments  are  particularly 
pronounced in  the  case  of the  European Community 
because the Six are committed not merely  to freedom 
of trade, but also to freedom of movement of workers, 
freedom  of movement  of companies,  and freedom  of 
movement of capital. Not nearly so much progress has 
been made with these other freedoms  as with freedom 
of trade;  further  liberalisation  will  intensify  the  eco-nomic interdependence  of the  member  states.  Over  a 
period of time, this could lead to a  situation in which 
the members would constitute what was, for most prac-
tical  purposes,  a  single  economic  area  and  in  which 
they would be obliged to coordinate, and perhaps cen-
tralise, all their major economic policy decisions. 
If it is  assumed that the Community will  carry out 
its full programme of freedom of trade and payments, 
then,  the  only  politico-economic  question  is  whether 
the  member  states  should  attempt  to  accelerate  the 
process, by setting up centralised economic and mone-
tary policies before they have become absolutely indis-
pensable  and  before  the  Community  has  evoled  into 
a  single,  homogenous  economic  area.  Germany  has 
historically had a  lower rate of inflation  than France; 
as a  result,  France has tended to devalue its currency, 
in  order  to  compensate  for  its  rising  prices,  whereas 
Germany  has  tended  to  revalue  its  currency  for  the 
opposite reason. If the two countries shared a common 
currency,  neither  of  them  could  devalue  or  revalue 
against the other, and France would cease to be able to 
compete against Germany. 
This then is  the dilemma at the heart of the contro-
versy  which has surrounded the question of monetary 
and  economic  union.  The  federalists  would  like  to 
press ahead with all speed, because it would accelerate 
the  process  of  political  union;  the  separatists  would 
like  to  move  as  slowly  as  possible,  on economic  and 
political  grounds.  In  between  there  are  those  who 
believe that the Community has already reached a posi-
tion where some explicit coordination of monetary and 
economic policies  is  necessary that more  coordination 
and centralisation will become necessary in future, and 
that plans  must be made to ensure,  at the  very least, 
that the member states can cope with the consequences 
of their increasing economic interdependence. 
The logic  of this  moderate  position was  recognised 
in  the  Rome  Treaty itself,  which  set  up  a  Monetary 
Committee to "review the monetary and financial situa-
tion of member states", and which  said that the gov-
ernments  should consult each other  and the  Commis-
sion on their economic policies (article 103). But during 
the early years of the Common Market, the states did 
little to give  effect  to these obligations. 
The first significant step towards monetary union was 
taken obliquely, at the end of 1964, when the Six agreed 
to  adopt common prices  for  cereals  as  part of their 
Common  Agricultural  Policy.  Since  they  did  not  at 
that  time  have  a  common  currency,  they  had  to  fix 
these  prices  in  terms  of  some  impartial  unit  which 
could  be  expected  to  be  reliable:  so  they  fixed  them 
in  terms of gold.  To be  absolutely  precise,  they fixed 
them  in  terms  of  a  newly-created  "unit  of 
account", which was  equivalent at current prices  to a 
US dollar's worth of gold; this was a convenient book-
keeping device,  since it meant that the prices could be 
treated  for  practical  day-to-day  purposes  as  though 
they were  in dollars. 
It was  widely  believed  at the  time  that  the  fixing 
of common farm prices would  force  the  Six  to move 
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towards  monetary  union  in  other  ways  too,  since  it 
would  henceforward  be  much  more  difficult  for  any 
of them to change the value of their currencies;  some 
people  even  believed  it would be impossible  for them 
to do so. For while France could still devalue the franc, 
it  could  not devalue  the  gold-based  unit of account; 
a  devaluation  of the  franc  would  therefore  mean  an 
increase in the prices paid (in francs) to French farmers. 
Similarly,  a  revaluation  of the  German  mark,  would 
mean a reducation of the prices paid (in marks) to Ger-
man farmers. 
The first  case  would  be  unwelcome  to  any  French 
government, since it would increase farm incomes and 
thus  stimulate  inflation;  the  second  would  be  unwel-
come to any German government, since the farm popu-
lation  would  oppose  any  reduction  in  its  income.  It 
was  therefore  believed  that the  Six  would  be unable 
to  change  their  exchange  rates  against  each  other, 
and  that  therefore  they  would  have  to  take  steps  to 
ensure that they did not need to, by coordinating their 
policies to keep their costs and prices in line with one 
another. 
The Six  did indeed, take some complementary steps 
to  coordinate  their  economic  policies,  at around  this 
time.  They  harmonised  their  budgetary  year  on  the 
calendar  year,  with  the  Italians  being  last  to  fall  in 
line  in  1965.  And they set up  a  number of new com-
mittees  to  discuss  budgetary policy,  medium-term eco-
nomic  policy  and central  bank policy.  But  neither  of 
these  moves had any appreciable effect,  since  the gov-
ernments were  not yet willing to engage in any mean-
ingful coordination. 
Their failure  to do so  may account in  part for  the 
events  of  1969,  which  demonstrated  conclusively  that 
the  fixing  of common  prices  in  terms  of gold  could 
not, by itself, prevent the member states from changing 
their  exchange rates in case  of need.  France ran into 
severe  balance  of payments  difficulties  after  the  May 
"Events" of 1968,  and devalued the franc in the sum-
mer of 1969;  and the Germans developed such a large 
balance  of payments  surplus in  those  two  years,  that 
they had to revalue  the mark in the autumn of 1969. 
(They  got round  the  consequences  of having  a  gold-
based  unit  of  account,  by  phasing  the  increase  in 
French farm prices over two years,  and by subsidising 
German farmers for their loss of income.) 
Somewhat uncharacteristically,  the Six  rapidly  drew 
the lesson from the currency disturbances of 1969, and 
at the  end  of that year,  at their  summit meeting  in 
The Hague, agreed that steps should be taken to move 
deliberately  towards  a  closer  monetary  and economic 
union. Much of the following year (1970)  was occupied 
with  preparatory  studies  carried  out  by  a  committee 
headed  by  Pierre  Werner,  the  Prime  Minister  of 
Luxembourg. The Werner Report concluded that com-
plete economic and monetary union could be achieved 
by 1980, provided that the member states had the poli-
tical will to do so; for it would mean that the authority 
over  all  major  economic  decisions  would  have  to  be transferred from the member states to the Community 
institutions. 
The  political  debate  that  followed  the  publication 
of the  Werner  Report  has  sometimes  been  described 
as  a  battle  between  monetarists  and economists,  with 
the French government being the main protagonist of 
the  monetarist  approach.  The  monetarists  wanted  to 
press ahead with  all  speed  towards monetary union-
that is,  towards  the  creation  of what  would  amount 
almost  to  a  common  currency-and  put  much  less 
emphasis  on the need to  coordinate or centralise eco-
nomic policy-making; the economists argued that mone-
tary  union  would  not work  unless  it were  buttressed 
from the start by the coordination of economic policy. 
The argument was not entirely academic: the French 
were reluctant to surrender sovereignty over economic 
policy;  the Germans, having  the  strongest currency in 
the Community, were afraid that they would be called 
upon to support the weak currencies, and in particular 
would have to use their balance of payments surpluses 
to  prop up the  franc.  At first,  therefore,  the  German 
government refused to contemplate any  move  towards 
monetary union unless there was a commitment to hand 
over  all  economic  policy-making  by  the  end  of  the 
decade. 
By the early spring of 1971, however, the Six reached 
a compromise:  they would  attempt to reach monetary 
and  economic  union  by  1980  in  stages;  after  three 
years  they  would  review  progress,  and  perhaps  take 
new  decisions  to  transfer  powers  to  the  Community; 
if the member governments (that is,  if Germany) were 
not satisfied  with these  new  decisions,  they could give 
two  years'  notice  and  drop  out  of  the  arrangements 
for monetary unification. 
The most precise part of the February 1971  package 
was an agreement to narrow the margins of fluctuation 
between the member states' currencies. Under the rules 
of the International Monetary Fund, any currency can 
fluctuate against the dollar by as much as one per cent 
either way. In practice, most European countries tended 
to restrict this fluctuation in the foreign exchange mar-
kets to three quarters of one per cent above or below 
the central parity. But this still meant that the European 
currencies could fluctuate  against each  other by  twice 
as  much as  they  could  against the  dolla;r,  at least  in 
theory:  the mark could move from  plus  0.75  per cent 
to minus 0.75 per cent, and the franc could move from 
minus 0.75 per cent to plus 0.75 per cent-a total move-
ment between  the franc  and the  mark  of 3  per cent. 
The Six  therefore  decided  to  reduce  the  total fluctua-
tion of their currencies against each other from  1.5 per 
cent to  1.2  per cent.  This was  intended as a  first  step 
towards  the  day  when  there  would  be  no fluctuation 
at all  between the  six  currencies-by which  time they 
would for most practical purposes amount to  a  single 
currency. 
Restricting  currency  fluctuation  in  this  way  could 
well  mean supporting the weak currencies. In 1970 the 
Six  had already set  up  a  $2,000  million  credit system 
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for  short-term  (i.e.  three  month)  financial  assistance; 
they now agreed to set up a second $2,000 million cre-
dit  network,  this  time  for  medium-term  mutual 
assistance. 
Before the narrowing of the margins could come into 
effect, however-it was scheduled to start in the middle 
of June 1971-the international monetary disturbances 
caused by the US deficit broke out again. To keep out 
the surplus dollars, Germany decided in May to let the 
mark float unsupported in the foreign exchange market, 
and it was  followed  by Holland.  (This  was  a  further 
demonstration  of the  fact  that the  small  countries  in 
the Community were bound by force of circumstances 
to  be  heavily  influenced  by  their  bigger  neighbours). 
Three months later, on August 15, President Nixon sus-
pended  the  United  States'  obligation  to  sell  gold  for 
dollars,  and from that moment on most of the major 
countries  stopped  supporting  their  exchange  rates 
against the dollar, and allowed their currencies to float 
(more or less  freely)  upwards in the foreign  exchange 
markets.  For the  time  being,  therefore,  the  plan  for 
linking  the  Common  Market  currencies  remained  in 
cold storage. 
Before the Germans floated the mark, in May,  they 
had tried· to persuade their partners to join them in  a 
concerted  Community  float,  in  which  all  the  Com-
mon  Market  currencies  would  be  allowed  to  move 
upwards against the dollar en  bloc. The suggestion was 
rejected  by  the  French,  who  were  reluctant  to  make 
it  easier  for  the  Americans  to  solve  their  balance  of 
,Payments deficit by increasing the price of the French 
currency (and thus the exports price of French goods). 
So  for the remainder of the year, instead of moving 
closer together, the Common Market currencies actual-
ly  moved further apart. Logically, it should have been 
in Europe's interest to act as a  group in what was,  in 
essence,  the  start of a  major  monetary  confrontation 
with the US; in practice, the French withheld any con-
cession to the US for as long as possible, with the result 
that they appeared  to  be  trying  to  maximise  the gap 
between the franc and the mark, in order to maximise 
their competitive  advantage  against  German industry. 
And they probably were,  to~. 
By  Christmas 1971,  however,  a new order had been 
restored, at least temporarily, to the international mone-
tary  system.  The  Americans  agreed,  at  the  so-called 
Smithsonian  pact,  to  an increase  in  the  official  price 
of gold,  and in return the rest of the world agreed on 
a new pattern of international exchange rates.  Among 
the  major  countries,  Germany,  and  especially  Japan, 
revalued  against  the  dollar  by  the  largest  amounts, 
while Italy, France and Britain revalued by the smallest 
amounts, with Holland and Belgium coming in between. 
But  because  of the  uncertainty  surrounding  the  new 
rate pattern-this was the first time that there had ever 
been  a  multilateral  realignment  of exchange  rates  on 
a  world-wide  scale-it was  also  decided  that  foreign 
currencies  would  be  allowed  to  fluctuate  against  the 
dollar,  not by  plus  or minus  1 per cent,  but plus  or 
minus 2.25  percent. In any case,  the new arrangement was expected to be only a temporary stop-gap, pending 
a  fundamental  reform  of the  international  monetary 
system,  by  which  the  dollar  would  cease  to  be  the 
central  pivot,  standard  of value  and  principal  reserve 
asset. 
In  the  meanwhile,  however,  the  Common  Market 
currencies found themselves not merely in a completely 
new relationship amongst themselves, with the German 
mark  substantially  higher  in  relation  to  the  French 
franc than before .the crisis, but also with a very much 
wider margin of fluctuation-9 per cent (  4.5 + 4.5  per 
cent),  instead of 3 l?er  cent. 
When  they  turned to  the problem  of reviving  their 
plans for monetary union in the spring of 1972,  there-
fore, their first task was to reduce this 9 per cent theo-
retical  spread,  which  was  so  wide  that it  could  well 
create serious disturbances in trade between the mem-
ber states, especially for farm products. Because of the 
uncertainty  surrounding  the  relationship  between  the 
new  European parities,  they  did not immediately seek 
to narrow the  margins of fluctuation  as  much as they 
had intended the previous year, but in percentage term~ 
they  went  much  further,  and  decided  that the  maxi-
mum  gap  between  their  currencies  should  not  be 
allowed  to  exceed  2.25  per cent. 
This  became  known  as  "the  snake  in  the  tunnel", 
with  the tunnel representing  the  maximum fluctuation 
permitted  for  any  Common  Market currency  against 
the  dollar,  and  the  snake  representing  the  maximum 
fluctuation  permitted  between  Common  Market  cur-
rencies.  In fact,  this  new  scheme  was  decided  by  the 
Six,  but was also  adopted by the four candidate coun-
tries-Britain 1,  Ireland,  Denmark  and  Norway-even 
though  they  would  not  become  full  members  of the 
Community before 1973. 
In some other respects the Community went further 
in buttressing their monetary plans than under the 1970 
1  Britain  of course  opted  out  of  this  agreement  when  the  Govern-
ment  decided  to  "float"  the  pound. 
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arrangements.  The Six  decided  to set up a  high-level 
steering group of civil  servants  to start the  coordina-
tion of economic policies, and agreed in principle that 
Community funds  should  be  used  to  finance  regional 
development. They also  asked the Commission  to put 
forward  proposals  for  achieving  economic  growth, 
price stability and full employment, as well as proposals 
for harmonising taxes and developing a capital market 
in the Community. 
These  agreements  were  little  more  than  statements 
of good  intention;  what  will  count is  the willingness 
of the  member  states  to  follow  them  up  with  cons-
tructive actions which will ensure that further progress 
can be made in future. The very first step-the narrow-
ing of the margin  of fluctuation  between  the  ten cur-
rencies-proved surprisingly easy,  because it started at 
a  time  when  all  European  currencies  were  relatively 
strong  against the  dollar,  and initially  no action  was 
required  to  keep  them  within  2.25  per  cent  of each 
other. The more sanguine European commentators took 
the view that the foreign exchange operators heard the 
news  of  the  Community  decision,  and  acted  accor-
dingly;  but there is no guarantee that they will  always 
wish  to  follow  the pronouncements of the politicians, 
and then the new arrangements will  start to be tested. 
Even  this  will  be easy,  compared with  the  task  of 
coordinating  the  economic  policies  of  ten  countries, 
and a  great many comfortable (though not necessarily 
useful) habits will have to be changed before monetary 
and economic union can become a reality. The British, 
for example, will be obliged not merely to change their 
tax year from  April-March to  January-December,  but 
also  to  abandon  the  ludicrous  tradition  of a  jack-in-
the-box  budget  which  springs  fully  armed  from  the 
head of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. There is no 
reason to suppose that economic and monetary union, 
complete with joint Community decisions on all major 
issues,  could not be achieved  by  1980.  But it will  not 
be easy. 
Further reading: see "European Studies" nos 14 and 16. The 
and 
Paris  Summit 
Europe's  future 
European  Studies,  15,  1972 
Described  as  a Magna  Carta  for  Europe  in  the  euphoria  that  followed  the 
Community's eve-of-enlargement summit in Paris in October,  1972,  the  final  com-
munique that emerged from  the meeting is  not quite that.  But it is a key docu-
ment for  the Common A1arket of the  1970's.  lt contains  few  surprises,  but sets 
out clearly  the  priorities  for  the  nine-nation  Common  Market  starting  off  with 
Economic and Monetary Union targetted for  completion by the  end of 1980. 
If the  1960's saw the Community concentrate on 
an  industrial  Customs  Union  and  the  creation  of 
a  Common Farm  Policy,  then  the  motor  of  EEC 
development over the next eight years  will  be pro-
gressive  integration in the  economic  and monetary 
sectors. 
First mooted at the Hague Summit of the  Six  at 
the end of 1969, one of the principal results of the 
Heads  of  State  and  Government  meeting  in  Paris 
was  to confirm the commitment to this  goal  of the 
three new member states. 
The one innovation of the Paris Summit was  the 
idea of creating  a  European Union by  1980,  coin-
ciding with the completion of Economic and Mone-
tary Union.  The te·rm  was  not defined at the sum-
mit, which decided to leave this task to  a  followup 
top level ga,thering of EEC leaders that will probably 
take  place  in  1976.  Participants  at the  Paris  ses-
sion were each content to believe that the idea of a 
European Union corresponded to their own concept 
of what the Community should look like at the end 
of the decade.  The final article of the Communique 
merely announces the intention of the heads of state 
and  government  to  "transform,  before  the  end  of 
the present decade  and with  the  fullest  respect for 
the treaties already signed, the whole complex of the 
relations of member states into a European Union." 
The Summit called on the Community institutions to 
draw up a report on this  subject before the end of 
1975  to be submiHed  to  another top level  meeting 
of EEC leaders. 
Much  of  the  rest  of  the  Paris  Communique  is 
cons.ecrated  to charting  the  necessary  advancement 
in related fields  so that the  1980  deadline for com-
plete  economic  and monetary  integration,  with  the 
possibility of a single currency can be attained.  Sec-
tors on which the Summit lays down specific guide-
lines include joint policies for regional development, 
social  affairs,  industrial  and  technological  integra-
tion. 
Economic  and Monetary  Union  (EMU in  Com-
munity jargon) and the associated sectors made up 
one of the three main themes  of the Summit.  The 
others were the Community's external relations and 
the strengthening of its  institutions. 
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The progress  made  by  the  Community  in  these 
three major fields between now and the next summit 
will  in fact  have  a  major  bearing  on  what  1980's 
European Union will look like. 
The Common Market seems now to have accept-
ed the idea of Summit meetings as a fact of life.  It 
has succeeded in the past in advancing step by step 
towards its targets by setting itself a series of dead-
lines in many fields. 
On close scrutiny, all that the Paris Summit com-
munique does apart from setting the 1980 deadlines 
for  EMU and the wider European Union is  to  list 
a detailed programme of what the Community insti-
tutions must achieve in 1973.  From 1974 onwards, 
the  Community  will  be  moving  towards  the  orbit 
of the next summit that will give the necessary impe-
tus for the final run-up to 1980. 
The targets for 1973 make an impressive list.  By 
the end of the year,  the Community must be ready 
to  move  into  the  second  stage  of  EMU,  the  first 
having  covered  the  1971-1973  period.  But  before 
then,  according  to  the  Communique,  the  following 
steps must be  taken: 
- by  April  1,  the  projected  European  Monetary 
Cooperation Fund must be set up; 
- by May 1, the EEC Commission must report on 
how the powers and responsibilities of the Com-
munity institutions  will  have  to  be  modified  so 
as to enable EMU to function properly; 
- by June 30, there will be a new report on future 
political cooperation; 
- by July  1,  the  Nine  are  committed  to  reaching 
agreement on a joint position in preparation for 
the world trade negotiations due to begin in the 
autumn; 
- by July 1, the Council of Ministers will take prac-
tical  steps  to  improve its  decision-taking proce-
dures  and  better  the  cohesion  of  Community 
action; 
- by July 31,  the EEC institutions will  have  pro-
duced  a  report  on  environmental  control; 
- by September 30 plans will be agreed to increase 
short-term credit facilities  under EMU; - finally  by  December  31,  the  EEC  Regional 
Development fund  will  be  established,  a  report 
will  be prepared on conditions  for  pooling cur-
rency reserves, an action programme in the social 
field will be drawn up and a timetable for a com-
mon industrial, scientific and technological policy 
will  have  to  be  worked  out.  In addition,  the 
Community  has  undertaken  by  the  end  of  the 
year  to  study  ways  of  more  effectively  aiding 
developing countries. 
Economic and Monetary Union 
Coming to the details of .the 16-article Paris com-
munique, more than one quarter of the text (articles 
one to four)  is  devoted to Economic and Monetary 
Union.  This  is  divided  into  three  main  headings: 
the  creation  of  the  EEC  Monetary  Cooperation 
Fund,  the  common  fight  against  inflation  and  the 
Community's concerted position on world monetary 
reform. 
The  decision  to  create  the  monetary  fund  by 
April 1 is perhaps the most significant.  It testifies to 
the community's  confidence  in the  future  of EMU 
since strictly speaking according to the Werner Plan of 
1970  that set out the blueprint for EMU, the Fund 
'":as  envisaged during the second of the  three  prin-
Cipal phases of monetary integration.  Now, despite 
the monetary upheavals of the past three years,  the 
EEC is  bringing  in  the  fund  at least  nine  months 
ahead of schedule  during  the  first  phase  of  EMU. 
The main function of the Fund is to coordinate Cen-
tral  Bank interventions  under the  EEC's ambitious 
scheme  for  narrowing  the  fluctuation  margins  be-
tween  the  currencies  of member  states  to  half  the 
width  permitted  under  international  rules.  The 
Fund, to  be administered by the Committee of Cen-
!ral  Bank  Governors,  will  also  put the  operations 
m  support  of  member  currencies  on  a  community 
rather  than  individual  footing.  For  this  purpose 
the  Fund will  use  the  European Unit  of  Account. 
In addition, the Fund will  take over the  running of 
the  system  of short-term  monetary  support  among 
EEC Central  Banks,  which  has  been  in  operation 
since 1971. 
For  the  Economic  half  of  EMU,  the  Summit 
stressed  the  need  to  coordinate  more  closely  the 
Economic policies of the Community and to intro-
duce  more  effective  Community  procedures. 
"Under  existing  economic  conditions,  they  (the 
Heads  of  State  and  Government)  consider  that 
priority should be given to the fight against inflation 
and to a return to price stability." 
On world monetary reform, the Paris  Communi-
que  lists  the  eight  principles  previously  agreed  on 
by  the  Finance  Ministers  of  the  Nine  in  London 
during the  summer  of  1972.  For the  Community, 
the definitive updated version of the system initially 
based  on  the  Bretton  Woods  agreement  should 
include: 
- fixed  but adjustable parities; 
- the general convertibility of currencies; 
- effective  international  regulation  of  the  world 
supply of liquidities; 
- a  reduction  in  the  role  of  national  currencies 
such as  the dollar as reserve instruments; 
- the  effective  and  equitable  functioning  of  the 
process of adjustment of parities with currencies 
that  are  undervalued  upping  their  parities  just 
as overvalued ones have to devalue; 
- equal  rights  and obligations  for  all  participants 
in the system; 
- the  need  to  lessen  the  unstabilising  effects  of 
short-term capital movements; 
- the taking into account of the interests of devel-
oping countries. 
"Such a system," the Communique notes, "would 
be  fully  compatible  with  the  achievement  of  eco-
nomic and monetary union." 
Regional Policy 
Regional policy is the first of the areas associated 
with EMU to be dealt with in the Community.  The 
text  speaks  for  itself:  "The  Heads  of  State  and 
government  agreed  that  a  high  priority  should  be 
given  to  the aim  of correcting,  in  the  Community, 
the structural and regional imbalances which might 
aff~ct  the  realisation  of  economic  and  monetary 
umon ... 
"From now on, they undertake to coordinate their 
regional  policies.  Desirous  of directing that effort 
towards  finding  a  Community  solution  to  regional 
problems, they invite the Community institutions to 
create  a  regional  development  fund.  This  will  be 
set up before December 31, 1973, and will be financed 
from the beginning of the second phase of economic 
and  monetary  union,  from  the  Community's  own 
resources." 
The commitment to create the fund,  financed  by 
the Community, was  a major Summit aim of British 
Prime Minister Edward Heath.  Given  the import-
ance of redressing regional imbalances in the United 
Kingdom  and  the  desire  to  get  a  return  from  the 
Community budget for  the major cont,ribution Brit-
ain  will  be  making  to  the  EEC  Farm  fund, 
Mr.  Heath banked on Britain being  a  major bene-
ficiary  of  a  Community  programme  for  correcting 
the "main regional imbalances in the enlarged Com-
munity and particularly those resulting from the pre-
ponderance of agriculture and from industrial change 
and  structural  unemployment."  Italy and  Ireland, 
each  with  considerable  regional  difficulties  backed 
the British on  this  point. 
Social Policy 
Social  policy  came  next.  It was  here  that  the 
Community leaders tried to underline the efforts  to 
be made to give the Common Market a human face, 
to  give  it  another  aspect  to  the  mercantilist  one 
President  Pompidou  of  France  warned  it was  ac-
quiring.  West  German  Chancellor  Willy  Brandt 
put  particular  stress  on  the  need  for  an  effective 
social  policy  as  an  essential  adjunct  of  economic 
and monetary integration.  The Communique stated: 
"The heads of state and government emphasised that 
they attached as much importance to vigorous action 
in the social field as to the achievement of the econo-
mic and monetary union.  They thought it essential to ensure  the  increasing  involvement  of  labour  and 
management  in  the  economic  and  social  decisions 
of the  Community." 
To this end the Summit called for an action pro-
gramme  to  be  drawn up  by the end of  1973  cover-
ing  concrete  steps  to  be  taken  and  the  supply  of 
necessary  resources,  particularly  in  the  framework 
of the Community's social fund. 
"This  programme  should  aim,  in  particular,  at 
carrying  out  a  coordinated  policy  for  employment 
and vocational training, at improving  working con-
ditions  and  conditions  of  life,  at closely  involving 
workers  in  the progress  of firms,  at facilitating,  on 
the  basis of the situation in  different  countries, the 
conclusion  of  collective  agreements  at  European 
level  in  appropriate fields  and at strengthening and 
coordinating measures of consumer protection," the 
Summit proclaimed. 
Industry and Science 
The last section  (article  seven)  directly  linked to 
EMU was  headed  "Industrial, Scientific  and Tech-
nological policy" and stated the Summit leaders con-
viction  of  the  need  to  establish  a  single  industrial 
base  for  the  Community  as  a  whole.  In order to 
reach  this  goal  action  is  needed  to  eliminate  tech-
nical  barrier  to  trade,  and  to  overcome  fiscal  and 
legal obstacles to transnational cooperation and mer-
gers between Community companies.  Furthermore, 
the Summit calls for the speedy adoption of a Euro-
pean company statute, the progressive  and effective 
opening  up  of  national  markets  for  public  works 
contracts, the promotion on a european scale of firms 
able  to  compete  internationally  in  the  sectors  of 
advanced  technology  as  well  as  the  transformation 
and  conversion  of  declining  industries.  Measures 
to promote fusions between community firms  should 
first of all be in line with EEC economic and social 
aims  and secondly not run counter to  its principles 
of fair and free competition. 
In the fields  of science and technology, objectives 
will  have  to  be defined  and  the  development  of  a 
joint policy ensured, that will include the joint imple-
mentation of projects of interest to  the Community. 
Thus, the Summit has succeeded in inserting Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union into a framework  of  a 
series  of  accompanying  policies.  This  is  to  the 
satisfaction of  most  member states,  although  there 
were  fears  expressed  in  some  quarters prior to  the 
Summit  that  France  would  have  preferred  to  see 
tighter monetary coordination as  the cornerstone of 
economic  and  monetary  integration  without  the 
other  elements  being  associated  so  closely  with  it 
-the idea  of monetary union  "pure et dure" as  it 
became known. 
The content of the second stage of economic and 
monetary union still has  to  be  agreed on.  All  the 
Communique  says  is  that  the  necessary  decisions 
should be  taken in  1973  to  allow  the  transition  to 
the second  stage  as  the  start of  1974.  France and 
Belgium  will  probably continue  to  give  priority  to 
monetary integration  (even  nar:rower  currency fluc-
tuation  margins,  pooling  of  national  reserves  and 
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closer  mutual  support  credits)  as  the  main  motor 
of EMU. 
For  Germany,  concerned  with  fighting  inflation 
and maintaining price stability above all, the second 
stage ought to give prominence to further coordina-
tion  of  economic  budgetary  and  fiscal  policies  of 
member states.  The Dutch think along similar lines. 
As far is  Britain is  concerned, it must include a 
common  industrial  base  for  the  community  and  a 
commitment  through  the  regional  fund  to  make 
Community  resources  available  to  help  her indus-
trially depressed  areas. 
External Relations 
Before dealing with  e~ternal relations, the second 
main theme of the Summit, the communique makes 
brief but important references to environmental and 
energy policies.  On the former (article eight of the 
text),  it calls  on  the  EEC institutions  to  work  out 
a  programme  with  a  precise  timetable  by  the  end 
of  1973 for action in this field. 
Turning  to  energy  policy,  the  Summit  asks  the 
institutions  to  formulate  "as  soon  as  possible  an 
energy  policy guaranteeing certain  and lasting  sup-
plies  under satisfactory economic condition.'' 
On external relations, the communique is  divided 
into  three  sections,  covering  the  developing  world, 
other  industrialised  countries  and  the  Communist 
states of Eastern Europe. 
As  for the first  category,  the  Communique  con-
firms  its  priority  towards  helping  the  development 
of  the  countries  of  Africa  associated  with  it  and 
towards  establishing  closer  links  with  the  nations 
of  the  Mediterranean  basin.  But in line  with  the 
recommendations of the U.N.  Conference on Trade 
and Development,  it invites  the  EEC and member 
states  to  adopt  an  overall  policy  of  development 
cooperation towards developing countries as a whole. 
In this context it picks  out the  following  elements: 
- the promotion, where appropriate, of internation-
al commodity agreements to stabilise the markets 
for  developing  countries'  exports  and  increase 
their earnings, 
- to improve outlets for manufactured goods from 
the  developing  countries  through  the  UN  gen-
eralised  preference  scheme. 
- an  increase  in  the  volume  of  official  financial 
aid.  Surprisingly  it  was  West  Germany  here 
that  came  out  most  strongly  against  setting  a 
specific target of 0.75 per cent of Gross National 
product  for  the  level  of  this  aid  by  1975,  as 
recommended by the UN; 
- the  improvement  of  the  terms  of  this  aid,  for 
example through special low rates of interest on 
loans,  particularly in favour  of  the  countries  at 
·the  bottom of the development scale. 
In its  relations  with industrialised  countries,  the 
community gives as its principle aim the implemen-
tation  of  action  ensuring  the  harmonious  develop-
ment of world trade.  The Community on  the  one 
hand wants to contribute to a progressive liberalisa-
tion of international trade by the elimination of tariff 
and non-tariff barriers.  It also  expresses  its  deter-
mination to "maintain a constructive dialogue with the United States, Japan, Canada and its other indus-
trialised  trading  partners  in  a  forthcoming  spirit, 
using the most appropriate methods."  This formula 
falls short of the type of institutionalised permanent 
dialogue,  particularly between  the  Community  and 
the  United  States,  that  some  Member  countries 
would have preferred. 
The  Summit  set  a  deadline  of July  1,  1973  for 
finalising  a  community  negotiating  position  in 
advance of the world trade negotiations in the frame-
work of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) due to begin later this year.  The Commu-
nique  adds  that  "The  Community  hopes  that  an 
effort  on  the  part of all  partners  will  allow  these 
negotiations to be completed in 1975". 
In  the  external  relations  context,  the  Summit 
makes  a  special  reference  ·to  Norway,  which  nego-
tiated  entry terms  that  were  subsequently  rejected 
by the Norwegian people in  a  popular referendum. 
"The Community declares its determination to seek 
with Norway a speedy solution to the trade problems 
facing that country in its relations with the enlarged 
Community."  In fact,  the intention is  to put Nor-
way on the same footing  as  the  other Countries of 
the European Free Trade Association by concluding 
an industrial free trade agreement with it. 
Article 13 of the Communique is devoted to rela-
tions  with  Eastern  Europe.  The  EEC reaffirmed 
that their co·mmon commercial policy, which forbids 
bilateral trade accords by member states would take 
effect  on  schedule  on  January  1,  1973.  There  tj 
s1till  however,  no  sign  that  the  Eastern  Europeans 
are any nearer reco·gnising the Community as a unit 
and of agreeing to Negotiate trade accords with it as 
a whole. 
The Communique takes account of this  situation 
by stating that member states "declared their deter-
mination to promote a policy of cooperation, found-
ed  on  reciprocity,  with  these  countries."  And  it 
goes on:  "This policy of cooperation is at the pres-
ent stage,  closely linked with  preparation and pro-
gress of the conference on security and cooperation 
in Europe to which the enlarged Community and its 
members  are called upon to  make a  concerted and 
constructive  contribution." 
Towards Political Union 
On  the  EEC's  own  foreign  policy  coordination 
as such, the Summit agreed to intensify the number of 
sessions  of  their  foreign  ministers  devoted  to  this 
topic from  two  to four a year.  The Heads of state 
and government "considered the aim of their coope-
ration was  to deal with problems of current interest 
and, where possible, to formulate common medium 
and long-term positions.  These consultations would 
continue to  be outside the scope  of the Community 
as such, since they do not fall within the competence 
of the EEC institutions.  But the Foreign Ministers 
would keep in mind the international implications of 
their efforts to reach joint positions on major issues 
and their effects on "community policies under con-
struction."  At the  same  time,  "on matters  which 
4 
have a direct bearing on Community activities, close 
contact  will  be  maintained with  the  institutions  of 
the Community." 
Finally, the  Communique turns  to  the reinforce-
ment of the EEC institutions, declaring that by the 
end  of  the  first  stage  of  economic  and  monetary 
union and based on a Commission report to be sub-
mitted by May 1, 1973, the institutions and member 
states must decide on the measures "relating to the 
distribution  of  competences  and  responsibilities 
among  Community  institutions  and  member  states 
which  are  necessary  for  the  proper  functioning  of 
an Economic and Monetary Union." 
But  despite  strong  Dutch  pressure,  the  Summit 
did not commit itself to any specific move  towards 
direct  elections  to the  European  Parliament.  The 
Netherlands  delegation  at the Summit  held  up the 
final communique as  it fought to get a commitment 
on direct elections.  "We must have European elec-
tions  to the European Parliament," Premier Barend 
Biesheuvel told his partners, "if we wish to involve 
every  European  in  the  moulding  of  European 
policy." 
But  despite  his  plea,  he  got  little  satisfaction, 
except for a formal statement in the text of the com-
munique reminding everybody that it is to be elected 
by direct universal  suffrage  under the  terms  of the 
Rome Treaty. 
In fact the question of greater powers  was  care-
fully divorced from the controversial direct elections 
issue.  The  Communique  startes:  "Desiring  to 
strengthen  the  powers  of  control  of the  European 
Parliamentary Assembly,  independently of the date 
on which it will be elected by direct universal  suf-
frage  under article  138  of the Treaty of Rome, and 
to  make  their  contribution  towards  improving  its 
working conditions, the Heads of State and Govern-
ment... invited the Council and Commission to put 
into  effect  without  delay  the  practical  measures 
designed  to  achieve  this  reinforcement  and  to  im-
prove  the  relations  both of the Council and of the 
Commission  with  the  Assembly. 
"The Council will, therefore, before June 30, 1973, 
take  practical  steps  to  improve  its  own  decision-
making procedures and the cohesion of Community 
action." 
Needless to say the absence of timetable for direct 
elections  displeased  the  majority  of  the  groups  of 
the  Padiament  itself.  In  addition,  all  spokesmen 
with  the  exception  of  Raymond  Triboulet  of  the 
European  Democratic  Union  (French  Gaullists) 
expressed  disappointment  at the  vagueness  of  the 
references  in the Community to the  Assembly. 
Having covered all this ground the Communique 
calls  for  the  creation  of  the  European  Union  by 
1980.  Whether  the  call  is  realistic,  and  whether 
the political will of the Nine is  really committed to 
making it a real "Union," should be clearer already 
by the end of 1973.  If the Community can achieve 
what it has  set itself for  1973,  then the wind must 
be  set fair for reaching the final  goal. 15U 
Brussels, rue de la Loi 200 - Tel. 35 00 40 